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Plaintiff and i 
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Appellant, s PRIORITY NO. 15 
s 
vs : 
: 930900564 CV 
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC : 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and : 
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Defendant and : 
Appellees. : 
: 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellee is submitting this Petition for Rehearing of 
the Memorandum Decision filed on March 7, 1996. This Petition for 
Rehearing is made in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about September 21, 1994, before the Honorable 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, the attorneys for the parties in this case 
entered into a voluntary stipulation and settlement agreement, 
purportedly resolving the dispute between the parties. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation, and in 
accordance with the understanding of the Defendants' counsel at 
that time, the Defendants were to pay $7,500.00. The stipulation 
and Order were first to have been prepared by Mr. Rust, counsel for 
the Plaintiff, and the Defendants were first to have had the 
opportunity to sign the stipulation and approve the Order as to 
form, pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
3. Counsel for the Defendants, Mr. Zoll, communicated with 
Defendant Floyd Weston over the telephone regarding this 
conditional stipulation and Mr. Weston, who was not clearly 
understood by Mr. Zoll, stated that prior to entering into the 
settlement agreement he would need to get the approval of the Board 
of Directors of the corporate Defendant. 
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4. Mr. Zoll described the material terms to the agreement to 
Mr. Weston at that time. However, Weston misunderstood Zoll 
relative to the conditional October 3, 1994 deadline, and believed 
that the stipulation would not be binding until and Order had been 
signed by the Judge, pursuant to his prior experience in such 
matters, until he had received a copy of the proposed Order and 
until the approval of the Board of Directors of the corporate 
Defendant, in entering into the agreement, had been received. 
5. The conditional agreement was never reduced to a written 
stipulation, and an Order embodying said agreement was never signed 
by the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-504(3), 
Utah code of Judicial Administration, nor was a copy of a proposed 
Order approved as to form by Mr. Zoll as Judge Rigtrup had 
required. 
6. Inasmuch as the members of the Board of Directors of the 
corporate Defendant were out of town at all relevant times, Floyd 
Weston was unable to get their approval for the settlement 
agreement. As a result, the $7,500.00 amount was not paid to the 
Plaintiff by October 3, 1994. 
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7. Appellee never had the opportunity to review the proposed 
Order until after the October 3rd deadline. 
8. Mr. Rust claims to have mailed a proposed draft of the 
Order to Mr. Zoll on September 22nd, but Mr. Zoll never received 
it. 
9. On September 28th, 1994, Judge Rigtrup signed the Order 
even though Mr. Zoll did not approve as the Order to form. 
10. On or about November 4, 1994, the Third Judicial District 
Court was scheduled to hear the Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate the 
Summary Judgment, which hearing was continued until November 18, 
1994, due to the fact that the Judge assigned to hear this matter 
did not yet have the Court's file. 
11. However, on November 18, 1994, this Court, the Honorable 
Judge Hyde presiding, made a ruling, granting the Plaintiff's 
Motion without ever affording the Defendants the opportunity for a 
hearing on the dispositive Motion, in spite of the Defendants' time 
request or for oral argument, made in accordance with Rule 
4-501(3)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
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12. The Defendant then filed a Motion for Relief from the 
Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
13. On or about February 2, 1995, Judge Hyde ruled to vacate 
his ruling of November 18, 1994, and ruled that Judge Rigtrup would 
be the proper judge to review the Defendants' 60(b) Motion, and to 
rule with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of 
Summary Judgment, due to the fact that Rigtrup was the presiding 
Judge at the time of the September 21, 1994 stipulation. In 
addition, on or about February 8, 1995, Judge Hyde signed an Order 
vacating the Summary Judgment, in order that Judge Rigtrup could 
make a decision relative to these matters. 
14. On or about February 27, 1995, this matter came before 
Judge Rigtrup for oral argument. The Court, after having the 
opportunity to review the procedural history of the case and the 
underlying merits of the respective parties' claims, ruled to 
enforce the material terms to the stipulation entered into on 
September 21, 1994, by allowing Appellee additional time to pay the 
$7,500.00. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Order was not valid because Mr. Zoll did not 
Happrove it as to formH as required by Judge Rigtrup. 
Appellee never had the opportunity to approve as to form the 
proposed Order submitted by Appellant before it was signed by Judge 
Rigtrup. According to the Stipulation that was agreed to by the 
parties and by the Court, Appellant's counsel, Mr. Rust, was to 
prepare a draft of a proposed order for Mr. Zoll's review before 
being submitted to the Judge for signature. However, instead of 
delivering a copy to Mr. Zoll, Mr. Rust simply submitted it to the 
Court for signature. Since Mr. Zoll never had the opportunity to 
approve as to form the Stipulation, it was not valid as submitted 
to Judge Rigtrup. 
II. Appellee never had the opportunity to object 
to the Order 
The Stipulation and ensuing Order was submitted to the court 
in violation of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
According to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
copies of "orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the 
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court and counsel within five days after service." 4-504(2) Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
In the Memorandum Decision entered on March 7, 1996, the Utah 
Court of Appeals ruled that "Weston had ample time to object to the 
stipulation and ensuing order." This, however, is not true because 
October 3, the day on which Appellee was required to pay Appellant 
$7,500.00, came before the expiration of time allowed by law to 
object to the Order. 
Mr. Zoll had until October 5th to object to the Order which 
came after the October 3rd date of performance pursuant to the 
Order. According, to Rule 4-504(2), Mr. Zoll had five days during 
which to object to the Order after it was signed by the court. 
Judge Rigtrup signed the Order on September 28, 1994. The Order 
required that Appellee pay Appellant $7,500 no later than October 
3rd. However, Appellee had at least until October 5, not counting 
three additional days of mailing, to object. Five days from 
September 28, 1994 for purposes of filing an objection, with the 
additional two days over the weekend, is October 5th. Since 
performance under the Order on October 3rd came before the 
expiration of the allowed time to object, Appellee did not have 
ample time to object. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals 
incorrectly ruled that "Weston had ample time" to object because he 
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did not have the time allowed by Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration• 
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in altering 
the terms of the stipulation. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in altering the 
terms of the stipulation to allow Appellee additional time to pay 
the $7,500 to Appellant. According to Utah law, the trial court 
has broad discretion to set aside a stipulation. In United Factors 
v. T.C. Associates, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that relief 
from stipulations may be granted by the trial court if there is an 
equivalent showing necessary to set aside a contract in equity, 
such as mistake of law or fact. United Factors v. T.C. Associates, 
Inc. , 445 P.2d 766, (Utah 1968). The Court further ruled that "it 
must be stressed that it was within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether the stipulation should be vacated." Id. 
As in United Factors, Judge Rigtrup determined, based on his 
own fact finding and within his own discretion, that the 
stipulation should be vacated. Judge Rigtrup was well aware of the 
inability for Appellees to make a timely objection to the order 
because the time for performance came before the expiration of the 
time to object to the Order, as outlined above. Judge Rigtrup also 
knew that given the unusual circumstances in which the stipulation 
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was negotiated created ample opportunity for Appellee Weston to be 
mistaken about the terms of the Stipulation. 
These mistakes occurred because Mr. Zoll had to communicate 
with Weston on a telephone in the jury room. Mr. Rust had the 
benefit of his clients being present in the courtroom while Mr. 
Zoll did not. As a result of the unusual nature of these 
proceedings, Weston misunderstood the terms of the Stipulation. 
Judge Rigtrup recognized these misunderstandings and referred to 
them as "excusable neglect." Judge Rigtrup as the fact finder, had 
the best opportunity to determine these facts and set aside the 
Stipulation based on principles of equity. 
In the Memorandum Decision filed March 7, 1996 by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, there is no indication of abuse of discretion by 
the trial court with respect to setting aside the stipulation. 
Accordingly, the Appellate Court's decision to reverse the trial 
court without a showing of an abuse of discretion is inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Utah Court of Appeals should grant Appellee's 
Petition for Rehearing because the trial court's ruling should not 
have been reversed. The trial court's initial ruling was correct 
for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Zoll never had the opportunity 
to approve as to form the Order as was originally agreed to; (2) 
Appellee did not have ample time to object to the Order because the 
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time for performance required by the Order came before the 
expiration of the time to object; and (3) the trial court did not 
abuse its discretionlin altering the terms of the Stipulation. 
DATED this lL day of March, 1996. 
ZOLL AND, BRANCH 
B. Ray ZoJ 
Attorney for Appellees 
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